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Old Walled Politics or
New Pandemic Peace?
Lessons from South Korea
By Seung-Youn Oh

Among the global pandemic’s
effects is the way it has exposed
the re-emergence of medievalstyle walled politics, where
countries reject international
or regional co-operation
and retreat into nationalist,
go-it-alone approaches.
At the same time, the crisis has
revealed unusual opportunities
to forge common approaches
to battling this invisible enemy.
South Korea, as a middle power
that stood out as an early
success story in the pandemic
fight, has played an important
role in countering the politics of
the past, writes Seung-Youn Oh.

16

The world is at an inflection point with the
Covid-19 outbreak, which has unleashed the
most challenging international public health
crisis in living memory. The accompanying economic shutdowns induced a global economic
contraction with an immediate and catastrophic
impact on demand, supply and financial liquidity. National and global leaders have been dealt
a serious stress test in the face of this invisible
enemy. Non-traditional security issues like Covid19 demand an unprecedented level of global collaboration among state and non-state actors.
Regrettably, what remains truly global is the
virus itself, which does not respect any boundaries. With the return of intensified great power
rivalries, multilateralism has given way to unilateralism. In the absence of global leadership, states
have pursued their narrowly defined self-interest by adopting a number of trade and investment
restrictions, and divergent policy approaches.
Calls to roll back globalization and economic
interdependence are growing stronger in developed countries. Exclusionary nationalist attitudes
and beggar-thy-neighbor policies have returned
to the global political stage with a vengeance.
The global pandemic has already altered the
world as we know it, but the long-term consequences of unrestrained power competition and
parochial nationalism will have further-reaching
implications than the immediate responses by
countries to the pandemic itself. The deepening
US-China rivalry had led to particularly strong
concerns for East Asia, with threats including
the construction of trade barriers within the
Asia-Pacific region and a new nuclear arms race.

1 Henry Kissinger, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the
World Order,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2020.
2 Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini, “A G-Zero World: The New
Economic Club Will Produce Conflict, Not Co-operation,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 90 No. 2 (2011): pp. 2-7. Accessed Aug. 2, 2020.

Escalating tensions between the two titans will
heighten the already severe dilemma among
middle power countries such as South Korea,
which sit uncomfortably between their most significant military patron in Washington and their
largest economic partner in Beijing.
What impact will the pandemic have on relations among East Asian countries? How should
South Korea navigate through this challenging
time without sacrificing either economic growth
or military security? And how can countries harness nationalism as a unifying force and a stepping stone toward internationalism rather than
allowing it to serve as a divisive ideology?
Returning to Past Politics?
The pandemic arrived at a time when the world
was already struggling to recover from USChina trade disputes, growing trade protectionism, falling commodity and energy prices, and
economic uncertainties in Europe over Brexit.
Instead of serving as a unifying force, the Covid
crisis has disrupted the global order developed
during the 20th century, reversed the process
of globalization and brought international relations back to a system of walled cities similar to
the medieval era.1 The absence of national and
global leadership has driven states and people
toward a self-help approach.
The intensifying power competition between
the US and China significantly complicates international efforts to respond to Covid-19. In the
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the US
and China worked together at the G-20 to ensure
that governments did not worsen the crisis by
engaging in competitive currency devaluation or
increased protectionism. Yet the Trump administration has shown no interest in maintaining
America’s traditional role in leading global health
initiatives, preferring instead to pursue “America
First” or “American Only” policies.

China’s diplomacy, meanwhile, has been counterproductive at best, as Beijing has missed golden
opportunities to prove its commitment to multilateralism. China not only suffered from a global
trust deficit due to its lack of transparency around
the initial outbreak of the virus in Wuhan. It also
lost face with its “face-mask diplomacy” — when
some of the medical equipment it shipped to foreign countries turned out to be defective. Beijing’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” — a term describing Chinese diplomats’ efforts to defend China’s
national interests — has backfired, because it has
focused primarily on propagating the purported
strength of the Chinese system rather than building greater multilateral trust.
Multilateralism is on the wane, embroiled
in the diplomatic tussle between Washington
and Beijing. Washington withdrew from the
World Health Organization on the grounds of
the organization’s partiality to China and its
slow-footed response to Covid-19. Beijing has
not demonstrated any better leadership in coordinating a multilateral response to the pandemic. At the Coronavirus Global Response
Summit in May, high-level officials from more
than 50 countries pledged US$8 billion for the
joint development of coronavirus vaccines. Neither the US nor China showed leadership at the
summit. Washington did not send a representative, and Beijing only sent its ambassador to the
EU instead of Premier Li Keqiang. Neither country pledged any financial support to international Covid-19 relief efforts. Far from being the
G-2 world that was promised at the beginning of
the 21st century, with the US and China working together on issues of international importance, we now live in a G-Zero world marked by
a global leadership vacuum.2
In the face of eroding global leadership, politicians of all stripes are spinning the pandemic
to their own ends — to promote regime stabil17
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3 Peter Hayes and Kiho Yi, Eds, Complexity, Security and Civil
Society in East Asia: Foreign Policies and the Korean Peninsula
(Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2015). Accessed Aug. 2, 2020.

ity in authoritarian countries or to win upcoming Rise of a New Pandemic Peace?
election battles in democratic ones. They play the What kind of challenges and opportunities does
nationalist card and scapegoat others to deflect the US-China great-power rivalry hold for East
blame about their own handling of the crisis. The Asia? In the post-pandemic world, are we going
public jumps on these nationalist bandwagons to to witness a fundamental readjustment in the
channel their fears and anxieties, driven by rac- region’s geopolitical landscape? East Asia has
ism, xenophobia or fear of economic loss. In the been dubbed as “more of an anti-region than a
process, scientists are often sidelined; misinfor- community” — where varying political interests,
mation and fake news spread like wildfire, com- stages of economic development and alliance
politics have hampered regional co-operation.3
plicating the fight against the pandemic.
The domestic political considerations driving Yet the ongoing fight to save both lives and livecountries’ foreign policy will make the road to lihoods calls for closer collaboration and greater
post-Covid recovery in East Asia much rockier. collective action. As neighbors, China, Japan and
US President Donald Trump will continue to bash the two Koreas share a common interest in both
China as he heads into a tough re-election cam- traditional and non-traditional security issues
paign. The idea of the “great decoupling” — sepa- that transcend national boundaries.
rating the American economy from China — has
First, North Korea’s nuclear threat is a tradigained traction beyond the likes of Peter Navarro, tional security concern that requires a shared
the controversial China skeptic who serves as one regional solution. In the early stages of the panof Trump’s economic advisers. US Secretary of demic, Pyongyang marked its busiest month for
State Mike Pompeo framed the US-China fight as missile launches in the country’s history, with
the ultimate clash of civilizations in his July 23 a total of eight short-range missile tests conaddress titled “Communist China and the Free ducted in March. Kim Jong Un’s three-week disWorld’s Future.”
appearance from public view — coupled with
China’s President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, will exchanges of gunfire across the Korean Peninnot make concessions when the global economic sula’s demilitarized zone in May — further comshocks have hurt his country’s already debt-laden plicate strategic uncertainties.
economy and challenged a political system that
Second, in terms of the economy, the panderives its legitimacy from economic perfor- demic exposed the dangers of making China
mance. His vision of a “China Dream” involves such an essential link in regional and global
the achievement of Xiaokang — a “well-off supply chains. The economic disruptions highsociety” that has doubled its per capita income lighted the national security implications of
between 2010 and 2020. Xiaokang requires an reshoring strategic industries and designing
annual GDP growth rate of at least 5.6 percent, redundancy into supply chains. States and firms
but China’s economy shrank by 6.8 per cent in are bound to promote diversified supply chains
the first quarter of 2020. This year marks the first as a result of Covid-19. Yet the most likely change
time Beijing has not set a GDP target since 1990. will involve further localization and regionalizaPresident Xi will be pressured to stabilize China’s tion of production rather than de-globalization,
political and economic situation leading up to full-scale reshoring or a great decoupling of the
2021, which marks the centenary of the Chinese economic world between the Anglosphere and
Communist Party.
the Sinosphere.
18

Facial recognition: Members of the Environmental Health Citizens’ Association of Korea wear coronavirus masks in a
campaign to prevent the spread of Covid-19 in Seoul in late March. The campaign slogan is ‘Healthy You, Healthy Me,
Healthy Neighbor, Healthy Family, Healthy Country and Healthy Neighboring Country.’ Photo: Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA

In fact, developments happening before the
coronavirus outbreak had prompted South
Korea to begin the process of economic realignment by strategically pursuing its “China plus
one” and “Japan-free” strategies to redistribute
the risks deriving from political tensions in East
Asia. The “China plus one” strategy was adopted
in response to Beijing’s all-out economic retaliation against South Korean firms in 2017 following Seoul’s decision to install the US-provided
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
anti-missile system. The “Japan free” strategy
was a byproduct of Tokyo’s export ban on key

chemicals for the manufacture of advanced semiconductors following a 2019 Korean Supreme
Court verdict in favor of the surviving Korean
victims of forced labor during Japan’s colonial
rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945.
China and Japan’s economic sanctions against
South Korea ironically ended up demonstrating
the tight-knit trade and investment ties among
the three countries. When Beijing placed sanctions against South Korean final goods, it continued to import intermediate goods (such as microchips and electronic components), which represented 78 percent of all South Korean exports to
19
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4 The concept first gained wide currency through the UN
Development Program in its 1994 Human Development Report.

China. In fact, South Korea’s overall exports to
China increased by 12.4 percent in 2017 and its
semiconductor exports increased by 30.4 percent.
Japan’s export restrictions on South Korea actually hurt Japanese companies more than Korean
ones. Japanese companies lost 23 percent of their
exports during the first 100 days of the dispute,
while South Korean companies experienced a
13.9 percent decrease.
China, Japan and South Korea together represent around 24 percent of the entire world economy. With a combined yearly trading volume
of more than US$720 billion, they form one of
the most integrated economic blocs in the world.
Post-pandemic economic readjustments could
provide a golden opportunity to develop tighter
regional supply chains through near-shoring and
to co-operate on establishing regional stockpiles
of key medical supplies. The Japanese government rolled out a US$2.2 billion repatriation
package in April to help Japanese manufacturers move out of China, but that is a drop in
the bucket compared to total Japanese investment in China. Thus, instead of taking an alarmist approach, strategic adjustment in trade and
investment policies between Japan and China
should be pursued as “positive-sum” regionalization encompassing Southeast Asia rather than
“zero-sum” mercantilism.
The last area for co-operation is non-traditional security, where East Asian countries can
work together to prepare for tomorrow’s pandemics or other transnational threats through
multilateral collaboration. In an address marking the third anniversary of his inauguration
in May, South Korean President Moon Jae-in
stressed “human security” that prioritizes people’s lives and safety as one of South Korea’s
main priorities moving forward from the Covid19 outbreak.4 Unlike a Clausewitzian concept of
traditional security that emphasizes state actors
20

South Korea’s domestic
success in combating the
Covid-19 pandemic has
renewed its bona fides as a
responsible middle power.
The country earned global
recognition not just for
what it did but also for
what it did not do.
First, it did not place a
comprehensive travel ban
on China and maintained
close communication
channels with Chinese
leaders. Second, it did
not impose aggressive
lockdowns in the topheavy way that China did.
Third, it demonstrated
its commitment to
multilateralism by sharing
its experiences widely.
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5 “Tackling Covid-19 Health, Quarantine and Economic Measures:
Korean Experience,” South Korean government report, March 31,
2020, at english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=
N0001&seq=4868; “Tracking and Tracing Covid: Protecting Privacy
and Data while Using Apps and Biometrics,” Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Apr. 23, 2020, at

www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/tracking-and-tracingcovid-protecting-privacy-and-data-while-using-apps-and-biometrics8f394636/; Flattening the Curve on Covid-19: How Korea Responded
to a Pandemic Using ICT, South Korean government report, May 11,
2020, at www.undp.org/content/seoul_policy_center/en/home/
presscenter/articles/2019/flattening-the-curve-on-Covid-19.html

and military threats, human security highlights the complex sources of insecurity that
are transnational in scope and non-military in
nature. As close neighbors, East Asian countries have experienced the debilitating transnational impact of infectious diseases and natural disasters together. The Korea-Japan-China
Trilateral Summit, formed in 2008 as a venue
to address such problems, can be expanded at
various levels for comprehensive risk reduction
and collaboration. The need to deal with traditional and non-traditional security issues in East
Asia may help transform the concept of regional
community-building from an elusive dream to
an achievable reality in the post-pandemic world.

nese leaders in order to discuss necessary travel
accommodations and restrictions. Second, South
Korea did not impose aggressive lockdowns in
the top-heavy way that China did, showcasing
the importance of leadership, transparency and
public-private partnerships. With Korea’s Center
for Disease and Prevention as the national command center, public and private actors worked
together on the expedited development of test
kits and drive-through test stations that set a
standard that other countries have endeavored
to follow. The authorities’ commitment to clear
crisis communication enabled the key actors to
work together on controlling the epidemic and
establishing public trust. Third, South Korea
demonstrated its commitment to multilateralism
by sharing its experiences widely with the World
Bank, the United Nations Development Program
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development.5
South Korea’s internal success in reining in
the outbreak provided the country’s leaders with
political space to cultivate a liberal and open version of nationalism instead of resorting to the
nationalist rhetoric that is often used in a time of
crisis to channel public fear and anger outwards.
The South Korean people affirmed this approach
by awarding the ruling party a historic landslide
victory in the National Assembly elections in
April, with the country’s highest-reported voter
turnout in 28 years. With such strong support at
home, South Korea seized the opportunity to collaborate with regional and international actors
on a range of diplomatic initiatives. President
Moon called for international solidarity to combat the virus at the G-20 and WHO annual meetings, while exchanging phone calls with leaders of 29 countries. Seoul has opened new diplomatic channels with African countries through
bilateral aid and collaboration among infectious disease organizations. President Moon and

Middle-Power Activism
In moving away from the “walled politics” of
the Covid-19 era, middle-power countries
should do more to champion multilateralism
and regionalism. Caught between China’s state
capitalism and America’s unilateralism, South
Korea is a middle power that understands the
mounting dilemma coming from geopolitical
competition. While great powers define the
overall contours of the geopolitical landscape,
middle powers are not passive spectators waiting for their fate to be determined by the system-level power game. They are weaker than
the great powers, but powerful enough to play
pivotal roles in establishing and maintaining
the regional balance of power.
South Korea’s domestic success in combating
the Covid-19 pandemic has renewed its bona
fides as a responsible middle power. The country earned global recognition not just for what it
did — combating the virus based on the strong
“3T system” of test, trace, and treat — but also for
what it did not do. First, South Korea did not place
a comprehensive travel ban on China and maintained close communication channels with Chi-

21
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6 Justin Trudeau, Sahle-Work Zewde, Moon Jae-in, Jacinda
Ardern, Cyril Ramaphosa, Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón, Stefan
Lofven and Elyes Fakhfak, “The International Community Must
Guarantee Equal Global Access to A Covid-19 Vaccine,” The
Washington Post, July 15, 2020.

seven other world leaders co-authored an opin- political collaboration. Return to the old walled
ion piece in The Washington Post to underscore politics is a risky path for all because exclusiontheir commitment to multilateralism and equi- ary nationalism in the region will further widen
table global access to coronavirus vaccines.6 This the cracks that already existed due to unremiddle power coalition is playing a proactive role solved historical memories, different regime
in offsetting the crippling impacts of great power types and alliance politics.
Nationalism is not always a divisive ideology.
rivalry and pushing back against the rhetoric of
It can be a force for solidarity during a crisis and
“with us or against us.”
As recent sour interactions between Seoul instill a sense of community that is much needed
and Tokyo demonstrate, the ability to manage in the war against Covid-19. Each nation’s
a sometimes testy relationship is an essential approach to the pandemic within its own boundaspect of middle-power activism. South Korea aries will largely determine whether a nation
and Japan’s tit-for-tat halt on visa-free entry in turns inward or outward after the recovery. GovMarch hinted at nationalism rearing its ugly head ernments that do the best job defeating the pandue to unresolved historical tensions between demic will earn political capital in international
the two countries. When mutual distrust runs relations; those that fail will take an adverse turn
high at the state level, sub-national and private toward protectionism.
The world needs foresight and united action
actors can generate a way to bridge differences.
For example, the City of Gyeongju in South Korea against an invisible and debilitating threat, not
provided medical gear to its Japanese sister cities, reactive blame-shifting and myopia. This fight is
Nara and Kyoto, when the national governments too critical to be subsumed by geopolitical power
in Seoul and Tokyo were slow to co-operate due games. It is also bigger than the G2 relationship
to their history of tensions. This kind of public between China and the US. With global leaderpartnership below the state level can help take ship in limbo, it is time for middle power counCovid-19 diplomacy to the next level — strength- tries to help build a road toward peace.
ening regional co-operation and providing a stepping stone away from inward-looking nationalism and toward greater internationalism.
Conclusion
We may be standing at the crossroads of a historically decisive make-or-break moment for
today’s global system of political and economic
co-operation. History tells us that when countries pulled up their drawbridges and embraced
economic nationalism, the result was war, devastation and destruction. The current pandemic
did not stem from competition between states
or shifts in the balance of power. Yet politicization of the virus and domestic insecurity have
shaken faith in global economic integration and
22
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